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Résumé / Abstract
Nous estimons un modèle de programmation dynamique des choix d’éducation
dans lequel le degré d’aversion au risque peut être estimé à partir des choix de
scolarisation. Dans notre modèle, les individus sont hétérogènes quant à leurs
capacités scolaires et aptitudes sur le marché de l’emploi, mais homogènes en ce qui
concerne le degré d’aversion au risque. Nous laissons les niveaux scolaires endogènes
influencer le niveau de risque concernant les  revenus d’emploi, et ce, à travers la
dispersion des salaires et la dispersion du taux d’emploi. Nous trouvons un faible
degré d’aversion relative au risque (0,9282) et nos résultats indiquent que les taux de
dispersion, aussi bien pour le salaire que pour le taux d’emploi, diminuent de façon
significative avec le niveau de scolarisation. Nous trouvons qu’une augmentation
contrefactuelle de l’aversion au risque va faire augmenter le niveau de scolarité atteint.
Finalement, un niveau faible d’aversion au risque implique qu’une augmentation de la
dispersion des revenus aurait peu d’impact sur le niveau de scolarisation.
We estimate a dynamic programming model of schooling decisions in which
the degree of risk aversion can be inferred from schooling decisions. In our model,
individuals are heterogeneous with respect to school and market abilities but
homogeneous with respect to the degree of risk aversion. We allow endogenous
schooling attainments to affect the level of risk experienced in labor market earnings
through wage dispersion and employment rate dispersion. We find a low degree of
relative risk aversion (0.9282) and the estimates indicate that both wage and
employment rate dispersions decrease significantly with schooling attainments. We
find that a counterfactual increase in risk aversion will increase schooling
attainments. Finally, the low degree of risk aversion implies that an increase in
earnings dispersion would have little effect on schooling attainments.
Mots-clés : Programmation dynamique, Rendements de l’éducation, Aversion au
risque, Capital humain, Dispersion des revenus
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1 Introduction
The acquisition of general human capital through education is one of the most
important activities by which young individuals increase their potential lifetime
earnings. While enrolled in school, individuals typically receive parental sup-
port and give up potential earnings in favor of higher future earnings. Parental
transfers can take the form of housing services and other living expenses (such as
food and transportation) and are typically una®ected by those random elements
a®ecting household income. As opposed to parental transfers, which are most
likely non-stochastic from the perspective of young individuals, future earnings
are usually unknown. Both wages and unemployment rates are random variables
that may vary over the life cycle and their distributions are potentially a®ected by
human capital. Indeed, it is well known that schooling can reduce substantially
the incidence of unemployment over the life cycle and can also increase lifetime
earnings.
The e®ect of schooling on earnings dispersion (or wage and employment rate
dispersion) is however more di±cult to characterize. In stylized \implicit con-
tract" frameworks, in which risk averse individuals are willing to trade wage
rigidity against stable employment patterns, it is reasonable to assume that the
need for risk sharing will be smaller for low educated workers who bene¯t from
a relatively high level of social insurance. However, at the same time, wage dis-
persion may also vary with factors such as union status, occupation type and the
like. As a consequence, the link between education and wage/earnings dispersion
is not trivial.1
Modeling the level of risk involved in schooling decisions must however go
beyond the e®ect of human capital on wages and employment and the di®erence
in uncertainty between parental transfers and labor market wages. The possibility
of interruption in the schooling accumulation process, due to various events such
as health or personal problems, academic failure or other causes, can increase the
risk associated to schooling as perceived by economic agents. This supplementary
source of risk also needs to be taken into account in modeling schooling decisions.
Estimating the e®ect of schooling on wage dispersion and employment dis-
persion is a complicated task. As it stands now, there is no strong empirical
evidence on the e®ect of education on wage/earnings dispersion. In the reduced-
form literature devoted to the returns to schooling, the parameters of interest are
often estimated from cross-section data. In such a framework, it is impossible
to distinguish between unobserved individual ability and true wage dispersion.
Heteroskedasticity is usually ignored. Moreover, as schooling attainment is an
endogenous variable, standard reduced-form techniques are ill-equipped to ad-
dress wage heteroskedasticity. As a consequence, modeling schooling decisions
and earnings dispersion in a context which allows for risk aversion requires the
1For a survey of the contract literature, see Rosen (1985).
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use of structural stochastic dynamic programming techniques.
Although the estimation of structural dynamic programming of schooling de-
cisions has become increasingly popular (Keane and Wolpin, 1997, Eckstein and
Wolpin, 1999, Belzil and Hansen, 2001 and Sauer, 2001), very few economists have
investigated schooling decisions in a framework which allows for risk aversion or
consumption smoothing.2 Recently, Keane and Wolpin (2001), Sauer (2001) and
Cameron and Taber (2001) have investigated the links between education ¯nanc-
ing and consumption smoothing and, more particularly, the e®ects of borrowing
constraints on schooling decisions. All of them present evidence suggesting that
borrowing constraints have virtually no impact on schooling attainments. Empir-
ical results reported in Cameron and Heckman (1998) also suggest that borrowing
constraints (and parental income) have very little impact on schooling decisions
as opposed to \long run factors". However, as far as we know, the relationship
between earnings dispersion (wage and employment rate volatility) and education
has never been investigated.
Along with the subjective discount rate, the degree of risk aversion is one
of the most fundamental preference parameters. For instance, knowledge of the
degree of risk aversion can shed light on the welfare improvements of policies
aimed at reducing income °uctuations over the business cycle. Until now, the
empirical literature devoted to the measurement of the degree of risk aversion
has been completely dominated by macroeconomists and ¯nancial economists.
In ¯nancial economics, the degree of risk aversion and the discount rate are
typically estimated in asset pricing frameworks using Euler equations. Usually,
the estimates of the degree of risk aversion (within a power utility framework)
range between 3 and 10 and represent a relatively mild degree of risk aversion.
Indeed, these estimates are quite di±cult to reconcile with actual data on long run
average returns on risky and risk-free assets.3 Strangely enough, labor economists
have been completely absent of the debate. This is surprising. In virtually all
western countries, labor income accounts for a much larger share of total income
than does investment income and, until very recently, macroeconomic policies
have been aimed at reducing variations in labor income.4 As a consequence,
measuring risk aversion from individual decisions a®ecting labor income appears
a natural research agenda.
The main objectives of this paper are the following. First, it is to estimate the
degree of risk aversion from a dynamic programming model of education choices
2In a standard recursive utility framework, such as the one used in this paper, there is a
one-to-one correspondence betwen the degree of risk aversion and the willingness to smooth
consumption (intertemporal substitution). Disentangling the behavior toward risk from the
willingness to smooth consumption is beyond the scope of this paper.
3It is well known that, in order to solve the \Equity premium Puzzle", the degree of risk
aversion would have to be enormous (certainly more than 50). For a review of the literature,
see Kocherlakota (1996).
4In most western countries, labor income account for 60% to 70% of total income.
3
in which individual preferences are set in an expected (non-linear) utility frame-
work and in which current schooling decisions a®ect lifetime earnings (wage and
employment rate) dispersion. The model is based on the assumption that indi-
vidual preferences are representable by an instantaneous power utility function
and that individuals maximize the expected discounted value of lifetime utility
over a ¯nite horizon. Young individuals make optimal schooling decisions while
taking into account that accumulated schooling a®ects both the ¯rst and the
second moments of the lifetime distribution of earnings. As a consequence, the
theoretical framework provides an opportunity to investigate both the degree of
risk aversion and the rate of time preference as separate parameters5.
The second objective is to evaluate how endogenous schooling attainments
a®ect the variances of lifetime wages and employment rates. A third objective
is to investigate the relationship between risk aversion and education (how does
education change with a counterfactual change in risk aversion). Finally, our last
objective is to evaluate how young individuals react to changes in the wage return
to schooling, changes in school subsidies, changes in wage subsidies and changes
in earnings dispersion.
The model is implemented on a panel of young individuals taken from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). We ¯nd that young individuals
have a very low degree of risk aversion. The parameter estimate of the degree of
relative risk aversion, 0.9282, is just somewhat below the degree of risk aversion
consistent with logarithmic preferences (objective 1). At the same time, our es-
timates of log wage and log employment rate regression functions indicate that,
after conditioning on individual speci¯c unobserved ability, wage dispersion and
employment rate dispersion are highly heteroskedastic. More precisely, both wage
and employment rate dispersions decrease with schooling (objective 2). This is
consistent with the hypothesis that risk sharing agreement are more common
among highly educated (high wage) workers. We also ¯nd that a counterfactual
increase in the degree of risk aversion will increase schooling attainments (objec-
tive 3). Finally, the simulations indicate that schooling attainments are relatively
more elastic with respect to school subsidies than to the return to schooling and,
consistent with the low degree of risk aversion disclosed in the data, that an
increase in earnings dispersion (an increase in the overall variance of wages and
employment rates) will raise schooling by a relatively small number (objective 4).
The content of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the presentation
of the model while the empirical speci¯cation is discussed in Section 3. Section 4
contains a description of the data. After a discussion of the structural parameter
estimates and the goodness of ¯t (Section 5), the links between risk aversion,
risk and schooling are investigated in Section 6. In Section 7, we present some
elasticities of schooling attainments with respect to the return to schooling, school
subsidies, wage subsidies and earnings risk. The Conclusion is in Section 8.
5We assume that individuals cannot borrow during school.
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2 A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model
The theoretical structure of the model is presented in Section 2.1 while the solu-
tion is discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1 Theoretical Structure
Individuals are initially endowed with family human capital, innate ability and
preference parameters. Given their endowments, young individuals decide se-
quentially whether it is optimal or not to enter the labor market or continue
accumulate human capital. The amount of schooling acquired by the beginning
of date t is denoted St: When in school, individual receive income support, de-
noted »t: The income support can be viewed as intergenerational transfers (or
school subsidies). The net income is assumed to be non-stochastic. This re°ects
that parental transfers are most likely una®ected by those stochastic elements
a®ecting household income. We assume that individuals interrupt schooling with
exogenous probability ³(St): The interruption state is meant to capture events
such as illness, injury, travel or simply academic failure and may vary with grade
level. In practice, it is di±cult to distinguish between a real interruption and an
academic failure as some individuals may spend a portion of the year in school
and a residual portion out of school, as a result of a very high failure probability.
When an interruption occurs, the stock of human capital remains constant over
the period. The NLSY does not contain data on parental transfers and, in partic-
ular, does not allow a distinction in income received according to the interruption
status. As a consequence, we ignore the distinction between income support at
school and income support when school is interrupted.6
Each individual is endowed with an instantaneous (per period) power utility
function. The expressions for the instantaneous utility of being in school,U s(:);
is as follows:
U s(»t) =
»1¡®t ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® (1)
Once the individual has entered the labor market, he no longer receives
parental support but receives a wage rate wt and an employment rate et. The
total income °ow, while employed, is given by Zt;= wt ¢ et:
The instantaneous utility of entering the labor market, Uw(:); is
Uw(Zt) =
Z1¡®t ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® when in the labor market (2)
Individuals are risk averse (loving) when ® > 0 ( ® < 0):Wages and Employment
rates are therefore perfect substitutes. Each individual maximize his expected
6In the NLSY, we ¯nd that more than 82% of the sample has never experienced school
interruption.
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discounted lifetime utility by choosing the optimal time to interrupt schooling
and enter the labor market. The discount factor, ¯; is equal to 11+½ where ½ is the
subjective discount rate. The time horizon, T, is ¯nite and is chosen to be when
individuals turn 65 years old (a typical retirement age). Education a®ects wages
and employment rates. The wage regression equation is given by the following
wt = exp('w0 + '
w
1 (St) + '
w
2 ¢ Expert + 'w3 ¢ Exper2t + "wt ) (3)
where 'w1 (St) is a function which summarizes the local returns to schooling and
where
"wt » N(0; ¾2w(St))
is a stochastic shock which represents wage dispersion.
The employment rate equation is
et = exp(·0 + ·1 ¢ St + ·2 ¢ Expert + ·2 ¢Exper2t + "et)
with
"et » i:i:d: N(0; ¾2e(St))
The stochastic shock "et represents employment rate dispersion. The dependence
of both ¾2e(St) and ¾2w(St) on schooling attainment is crucial. It will allow us to
measure how schooling decisions may be linked to wage and employment disper-
sion.
It is convenient to summarize the return to schooling in the following equation
logZt = '0 + '1(St) + '2 ¢ Expert + '3 ¢ Exper2t + "t
where
"t = "
w
t + "
e
t » i:i:d: N(0; ¾2(St))
'0 = '
w
0 + ·0
'1(St) = '
w
1 (St) + ·1
'2 = '
w
2 + ·2
'3 = 'w3
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2.2 The Solution
It is well known that the solution to the stochastic dynamic problem can be
characterized using recursive methods. First, we must solve for the expected
instantaneous (per period) utility and, secondly, we need to isolate the stochastic
shock ("wt ) in order to obtain a closed-form solution for the probability of choosing
to continue school or to enter the labor market.
The value functions associated to the decision to remain in school, V st (St);
given that an individual has already acquired St years of schooling, can be ex-
pressed as
V st (St) =
»1¡®t ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® +¯f³(St)¢EV
I
t+1(St+1)+(1¡³(St))¢EMax[V st+1(St+1); V wt+1(St+1)]g
Given the absence of distinction between income during school interruption and
income while in school, the value of entering a school interruption period, V It (St),
is expressed in a similar fashion as V st (St), that is
V st (St) =
»1¡®t ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® + ¯E(Vt+1 j dt = 1) (4)
where E(Vt+1 j dt = 1) denotes the value of following the optimal policy next
period (either remain at school or start working) and where the expected value
is taken over the distribution of potential labor market wages and employment
rates.
The value of stopping schooling accumulation is the value of entering the
labor market with St years of schooling and no labor market experience, V wt (St),
is given by
V wt (St) =
(exp('0 + '1(St) + "t))1¡® ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® + ¯E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) (5)
where E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) denotes the discounted expected value of lifetime earnings
of starting work in the labor market with t years of schooling, no labor market
experience and T-t years of potential speci¯c human capital accumulation ahead.
Clearly,
E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) =
E
TX
j=t+1
¯j¡(t+1)
(
(exp('0 + '1(Sj) + '2 ¢ Experj + '3 ¢ Exper2j + "j))1¡® ¡ 1
1 ¡ ®
)
(6)
Closed-form solution to the problem can be obtain by noting that
E(VT ) = EU(exp(ln(ZT ))) = E
(exp(ln(ZT )))1¡® ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® (7)
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and that Z +1
¡1
(exp(ln(ZT )))1¡® ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® fT (Z) dZ =
expf¹T :(1 ¡ ®) + 12¾2T ¢ (1 ¡ ®)2g ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® (8)
where fT (Z) is the normal density with parameters ¹T and ¾2T and where
¹T = '0 + '1(ST ) + '2:ExperT + '3:Exper2T (9)
The expected utility of entering any period can be solved using recursive
methods (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989).
3 Empirical Speci¯cation
In the sample data, everyone has at least 6 years of education. As a consequence,
we only model the decision to acquire schooling beyond six years. We also assume
that the returns to accumulated education and experience at 65 (upon retirement)
is 0 and that parental transfers are set to 0 upon entrance in the labor market.
3.1 The Utility of Attending School
Parental transfers are given by the following equation,
»it = exp(X 0i± + À
»
i ) (10)
The vector Xi contains the following variables; parents' education (both mother
and father), household income, number of siblings, family composition at age 14
and regional controls. The household composition variable (Nuclear Family) is
equal to 1 for those who have been raised with both their biological parents (at
age 14) and is likely to be correlated with the psychic costs of attending school.
The geographical variables are introduced in order to control for the possibility
that direct (as well as psychic) costs of schooling may di®er between those raised
in urban areas and those raised in rural areas and between those raised in the
South and those raised in the North. The term À»i represents unobserved taste
for schooling and is described in Section (3.4).
3.2 Wages and Employment Rates
Observed wages, log ~wit, are assumed to be the sum of the true wage (logwit)
and a measurement error ("mit ), that is the log wage (observed) regression is
8
log ~wit = '0 + '1(Sit) + '2:Experi;t + '3:Exper2i;t + À
w
i + "
w
it + "
m
it
where Àwi is unobserved labor market ability a®ecting wages and where "mit » i:i:d:
N(0; ¾2m): The employment equation is
log eit = ·0 + ·1 ¢ Si;t + ·2 ¢ Experi;t + ·3 ¢ Exper2i;t + À·i + "eit
The term À·i captures the e®ect of unobserved ability on employment rates and
where "eit » i:i:d: N(0; ¾2e)
3.3 Earnings Dispersion and Education
We assume that the variance of wages and employment rates are heteroskedastic.
The variances, ¾2e(St) and ¾2w(St) are given by the following,
¾w(St) = exp(¾w0 + ¾w1 ¢ St + ¾w2 ¢ S2t )
¾e(St) = exp(¾e0 + ¾e1 ¢ St + ¾e2 ¢ S2t )
3.4 Unobserved Ability in School and in the Labor Mar-
ket
The intercept terms of the utility of attending school (À»i ); the employment rate
equation (·0i) and of the log wage regression function (Àwi ) are individual speci¯c.
We assume that there are K types of individuals. Each type is endowed with a
vector of intercept terms (Àwk ; À
»
k; À·k ) for k = 1; 2:::K and K = 6.
The distribution of unobserved ability is orthogonal to parents' background
by construction. As a consequence, the distribution of ability which we estimate
should be understood as a measure of unobserved ability remaining after condi-
tioning on parents human capital. The probability of belonging to type k; pk; are
estimated using logistic transforms
pk =
exp(q0k)P6
j=1 exp(q0j )
and with the restriction normalize q6 to 0.
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3.5 Identi¯cation
With data on wages, employment rates and schooling attainments, it is straight-
forward to identify the key parameters the utility of attending school, the wage re-
turn to schooling, the employment return to schooling and unobserved school and
market ability. This does not require further discussion (see Belzil and Hansen,
2001). The identi¯cation of the degree of risk aversion (®) is also straightforward
to establish given knowledge of the variance of earnings (see equation 8).
However, the identi¯cation (and estimation) of a structural dynamic program-
ming model always requires some parametric assumptions.7 For instance, iden-
ti¯cation of the subjective discount rate relies on the standard assumption that
preferences are time additive. Also, given that the model allows for unobserved
taste for schooling, it is unrealistic to account for other sources of preference
heterogeneity such as individual di®erences in risk aversion or in discount rates.
This means that, given parents' background variables and unobserved market
ability, observed di®erences in schooling are automatically imputed to di®erences
in taste for schooling.8
3.6 Constructing the Likelihood
Dropping the individual subscript, the probability of investing in schooling in a
given year is given by
Pr(dt = 1) = Pr [V st (St) ¸ V wt (St)] = Prf»
1¡®
t ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® + ¯E(Vt+1 j dt = 1) ¸
(exp(ln(Zt)))1¡® ¡ 1
1 ¡ ® + ¯E(Vt+1 j dt = 0)g (11)
or, equivalently, as
Pr(dt = 1) = Prf(1¡®)Zt · log
h
»1¡®t + (1 ¡ ®)¯[E(Vt+1 j dt = 1) ¡E(Vt+1 j dt = 0)]
ig
and can be expressed as follows.
Pr(dit = 1) = Pr("t · [ h(St)]) = ©(h(St)¾w(t)) (12)
7The degree of under-identi¯cation arising in the dynamic programming literature is dis-
cussed in Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2001).
8While another possible estimation strategy could have been to include AFQT scores in the
intercept terms of both the utility of attending school and the log wage regression function,
we are reluctant to do so. This approach could lead to an understatement of the e®ects of
schooling on wages and an understatement of risk aversion heterogeneity, if AFQT scores are
themselves explained by schooling (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000)
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where h(St) is given by
h(St) =
1
1 ¡ ® ¢log
·
(1 ¡ ®) ¢ (V st (St) ¡ ¯E(Vt+1 j dt = 0) + 11 ¡ ®)
¸
g¡'0¡'1(St)
The likelihood function is constructed from data on schooling attainments
as well as the allocation of time between years spent in school (It = 0; dt =
1) and years during which school was interrupted (It+1 = 1; dt = 1) and on
employment histories (wage/unemployment) observed when schooling acquisition
is terminated (until 1990). The construction of the likelihood function requires
to evaluate the following probabilities;
² the probability of having spent at most ¿ years in school (including years
of interruption), Pr[(di;0 = 1; I0); (di;1 = 1; I1)::::(di;¿ = 1; I¿ )] = L1 and is
easily evaluated using (11) and the de¯nition of the interruption probability.
² the probability of entering the labor market, in year ¿ + 1; at observed
wage ~wi;¿+1; P (di;¿+1 = 0; ~wi;¿+1) = L2, which can easily be factored as the
product of a conditional times a marginal
² the density of observed wages and employment rates from ¿ +2 until 1990,
Pr (f ~wi;¿+2; ei;¿+2g::f ~wi;1990; ei;1990g) = L3, which is easily evaluated using
the fact that the random shocks a®ecting the employment process and the
wage process are mutually independent.
The log likelihood function, for a given individual, is given by
logLi = log
K=6X
k=1
pk ¢ L1i(k) ¢ L2i(k) ¢ L3i(k) (13)
where each pk represents the population proportion of type k.
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4 The Data
The sample used in the analysis is extracted from the 1979 youth cohort of the
The National Longitudinal Survey of Y outh (NLSY). The NLSY is a nation-
ally representative sample of 12,686 Americans who were 14-21 years old as of
January 1, 1979. After the initial survey, re-interviews have been conducted in
each subsequent year until 1996. In this paper, we restrict our sample to white
males who were age 20 or less as of January 1, 1979. We record information on
education, wages and on employment rates for each individual from the time the
individual is age 16 up to December 31, 1990.
The original sample contained 3,790 white males. However, we lacked infor-
mation on family background variables (such as family income as of 1978 and
parents' education). We lost about 17% of the sample due to missing informa-
tion regarding family income and about 6% due to missing information regarding
parents' education. The age limit and missing information regarding actual work
experience further reduced the sample to 1,710.
Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation can be found in
Table 1. The education length variable is the reported highest grade completed
as of May 1 of the survey year and individuals are also asked if they are currently
enrolled in school or not.9 This question allows us to identify those individuals
who are still acquiring schooling and therefore to take into account that educa-
tion length is right-censored for some individuals. It also helps us to identify
those individuals who have interrupted schooling. Overall, the majority of young
individuals acquire education without interruption. The low incidence of inter-
ruptions (Table 1) explains the low average number of interruptions per individual
(0.22) and the very low average interruption duration (0.43 year) . In our sample,
only 306 individuals have experienced at least one interruption. This represents
only 18% of our sample and it is along the lines of results reported in Keane and
Wolpin (1997).10 Given the age of the individuals in our sample, we assume that
those who have already started to work full-time by 1990 (94% of our sample),
will never return to school beyond 1990. Finally, one notes that the number of
interruptions is relatively small.
The average schooling completed (by 1990) is 12.8 years. From Table 1, it is
clear that the distribution of schooling attainments is bimodal. There is a large
fraction of young individuals who terminate school after 12 years (high school
graduation). The next largest frequency is at 16 years and corresponds to college
graduation. Altogether, more than half of the sample has obtained either 12 or
16 years of schooling. As a consequence, one might expect that either the wage
9This feature of the NLSY implies that there is a relatively low level of measurement error
in the education variable.
10Overall, interruptions tend to be quite short. Almost half of the individuals (45 %) who
experienced an interruption, returned to school within one year while 73% returned within 3
years.
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return to schooling or the parental transfers vary substantially with grade level.
This question will be addressed below.
5 Structural Estimates and Goodness of Fit
In this section, we present a brief overview of some of the main structural para-
meter estimates which do not raise immediate interest and evaluate the goodness
of ¯t of the model. The parameter estimates (found in Table A2) indicate that,
other things equal, the utility of attending school increases with parents' educa-
tion and income. This is well documented in various reduced-form studies as well
as in many structural studies (see Belzil and Hansen, 2001, Eckstein and Wolpin,
1999 and Cameron and Heckman, 1998). The parameter estimates characterizing
the distribution of all individual speci¯c intercept terms (school ability, employ-
ment and wage regression and type probabilities) are also found in Table A2. The
di®erences in intercept terms across types are indicative of the importance of un-
observed ability a®ecting wages, employment rates and the utility of attending
school.11 The resulting type probabilities are 0.36 (type 1), 0.19 (type 2), 0.31
(type 3), 0.06 (type 4), 0.03 (type 5) and 0.06 (type 6). The spline estimates of
the local returns to schooling, also found in Table A2, can be transformed into
local returns (after adding up the proper parameters). More details on the return
to schooling can be found in Belzil and Hansen (2001).12
The predicted schooling attainments, along with actual frequencies are found
in Table 1, and allow us to evaluate the goodness of ¯t. There is clear evidence
that our model is capable of ¯tting the data well. In particular, our model is
capable of predicting the very large frequencies at the most frequent grade levels
(grade 12, grade16 and grade10).
11Similar results are reported in Belzil and Hansen (2001), Eckstein and Wolpin (2000) and
Keane and Wolpin (1997).
12Belzil and Hansen (2001) argue that the returns to schooling are much lower than those
reported previously in the literature and ¯nd evidence that the log wage regression is highly
convex in schooling.
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Table 1
Model Fit: Actual vs Predicted Schooling Attainments
Grade Level Predicted (%) Actual (%)
6 0.0% 0.3 %
7 1.7% 0.6%
8 2.2% 2.9%
9 5.2% 4.7%
10 7.0% 6.0 %
11 8.9% 7.5 %
12 45.3% 39.6 %
13 5.8% 7.0 %
14 5.1% 7.7 %
15 1.5% 2.9 %
16 9.1% 12.9 %
17 5.1% 2.5 %
18 2.1% 2.4%
19 1.0% 1.3%
20-more 0.2% 1.6%
6 Risk Aversion, Earnings and Education: Some
Results
In this section, we discuss the three following issues; the degree or risk aversion
revealed in the data, the e®ect of education on earnings dispersion (as measured
by the variances of wages and employment rates) and the e®ect of a counterfactual
change in risk aversion on schooling attainment.
6.1 The Degree of Risk Aversion
Given the objectives of the paper, the estimates of the preference parameters
are those that raise most interest. Our estimate of the discount rate, 0.0891,
appears quite reasonable. In practice, the willingness to trade current wages for
future wages is likely to be a®ected by imperfections in the capital market. The
estimate of the degree of relative risk aversion, 0.9282 is however quite low when
compared to estimates cited in the ¯nance literature.13 In order to illustrate the
low degree of risk aversion, we examined the behavior toward risk of two types of
labor market entrant (a high school graduate and a college graduate). Without
13See kocherlakota, 1996
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loss of generality, we restrict ourself to a single period hourly wage lottery which
is characterized by the parameters of the log wage distribution. We computed the
certainty equivalent hourly wage rate and compared it with the expected hourly
wage rate resulting from the within period lottery. The certainty equivalent is
the certain wage rate, wc; at which wc = U¡1(E(w)): We have also computed
the level of absolute risk aversion (¡U
00(E(w))
U 0(E(w)) ) at the expected entry wage. Both
measures of risk aversion (absolute and relative) as well as the expected wage
and the certainty equivalent are found in Table 2. They illustrate the very low
degree of risk aversion. A high school graduate, who who obtain on average an
hourly wage rate of $6.32, would be as well o® with a certain wage of $6.13. For
a college graduate, the corresponding expected wage and certainty equivalent are
equal to $8.65 and 8.46.
Table 2
Measures of Risk Aversion
High School College
Graduates Graduates
Relative Risk aversion 0.9282 0.9282
(®)
Absolute Risk aversion 0.1469 0.1073
¡U 00(E(w))
U 0(E(w))
Expected wage (E(W)) 6.3183 8.6478
Certainty equivalent 6.1337 8.4579
(wc = U¡1(E(w)))
Note: The degree of relative risk aversion, ®, also equal to -w¢U"(E(w))U0(E(w)) . The
absolute degree of risk aversion is de¯ned as -¢U"(E(w))U0(E(w)) : The certainty equivalent
wage, wc; is de¯ned as the solution of the following equation: wc = U¡1(E(w))
6.2 The E®ects of Education on Earnings Dispersion
In the empirical literature, homoskedasticity of the log wage regression function
is rarely questioned. With a structural dynamic programming model taking into
account individual unobserved heterogeneity, it is possible to distinguish the dis-
tribution of unobserved ability from the distribution of stochastic wage shocks.
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The variance of stochastic wage shocks is a measure of wage dispersion and the
e®ect of schooling on wage and employment rate variances can easily be com-
puted. The quadratic speci¯cation of the log wage variance, along with estimates
of ¾w0 (-1.3739); ¾w1 (0.0214) and ¾w2 (-0.0032), which are found in Table A2,
imply that wage dispersion will attain a maximum at 9 years of schooling and
decrease thereafter. In practice, this means that wage dispersion decreases sig-
ni¯cantly with human capital for almost all individuals. At the same time, the
estimates for ¾e0 (-0.4084); ¾e1 (0.0214) and ¾e2 (-0.0032) imply that employment
rate dispersion decreases monotonically with schooling attainments.
In order to establish more clearly the links between risk and education, we
have computed the variances in lifetime wages, lifetime employment rates and
lifetime earnings for all possible levels of schooling. All variances are measured
over a period of 45 years of potential experience. The results are in Table 3. The
decrease in employment rate and wage dispersion with schooling is well illustrated
in columns 1 and 2. As earnings are de¯ned as the product of an hourly wage
rate times an employment rate, the variance in lifetime earnings also decreases
dramatically with schooling attainments. The evidence suggests that schooling
acquisition implies a signi¯cant reduction in total risk.
Table 3
Schooling Attainments and the variances of lifetime wages,
employment rates and earnings
Variance of Variance of Variance of
Emp. rates (log) Wages (log) Earnings (log)
grade level
7 16.02 2.99 19.01
8 12.64 3.06 15.70
9 9.78 3.09 12.87
10 7.41 3.09 10.50
11 5.50 3.04 8.54
12 4.00 2.96 6.96
13 2.85 2.84 5.70
14 1.99 2.70 4.69
15 1.36 2.52 3.89
16 0.91 2.33 3.25
17-more 0.60 2.13 2.73
Note: Variances are computed over a period of 45 years of potential
experience
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6.3 The E®ect of Risk Aversion on Education
After having established the link between education and earnings dispersion, it
is natural to investigate the relationship between risk aversion and education.
As explained earlier, it is unrealistic to account for other sources of preference
heterogeneity such as individual di®erences in risk aversion or in discount rates.
While our model has been estimated under the assumption that preferences are
homogenous (individuals di®er only in terms of ability), it is easy to evaluate
how mean schooling attainments change with a counterfactual change in risk
aversion. This counterfactual experiment may be viewed as an evaluation of the
importance of the di®erences in schooling attainments between various sub-groups
of the population endowed with di®erent levels of risk aversion. For the sake of
comparison with the results usually reported in the empirical ¯nance literature,
we have computed mean schooling attainments for levels of relative risk aversion
between 0.93 and 3.00. These are found in Table 4. These simulations indicate
that, over the range considered, mean schooling attainments will increase with
risk aversion. For instance, at a relatively high degree of risk aversion such as
® = 3:0; individuals would obtain, on average, 18.50 years of schooling.
Table 4
Risk Aversion and Expected Schooling Attainments
Relative Risk Mean
Aversion (®) Schooling
® = 0:93 12.45 years
® = 1:00 12.49 years
® = 1:5 13.65 years
® = 2:0 16.19 years
® = 3:0 18.50 years
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7 Some Elasticities of Schooling Attainments
In this section, we evaluate the elasticities of mean schooling attainments with
respect to changes in some of the key parameters of the model. In particular, we
investigate individual reactions to changes in the wage and employment returns
to schooling as well as changes in schooling attainments due to changes in school
and wage subsidies.
7.1 How do people react to changes in the returns to ed-
ucation
Using counterfactual changes in the return to schooling, it is easy to evaluate
mean schooling attainments elasticities. As the wage return to schooling is es-
timated °exibly, we simulated changes in the overall return and also simulated
changes in the return to college graduation. The elasticities with respect to the
wage return, reported in Table 5, are 0.35 (for an overall increase) and 0.11 (for an
increase in the return to college graduation). Schooling attainments are therefore
relatively inelastic with respect to the wage return to schooling.
7.2 How do people react to changes in school Subsidies
and Wage Subsidies
As for the wage return to schooling, it is possible to evaluate the elasticities
of schooling attainments with respect to an overall increase in earnings while at
school (school subsidies) or a subsidy to post high-school education. As expected,
the elasticity with respect to a general increase (1.01) exceeds the elasticity to
post high-school education (0.46). When compared to the elasticities reported
in Section 7.1, these elasticities indicate that individual are more responsive to
school subsidies (or parental transfers) than to the return to schooling. Finally,
by increasing the intercept term of the wage regression, it is possible to simulate
the e®ect of a wage subsidy. It is well known that an overall increase in wages
will result in an increase in the opportunity costs of schooling. Not surprisingly,
our results indicate that the elasticity of schooling attainments with respect to a
wage increase is negative (-0.70) and strong.
As a conclusion, schooling attainments appear more sensitive to changes in
the utility of attending school than to changes in the return to schooling. This is
consistent with ¯ndings reported in Belzil and Hansen (2001), Keane and Wolpin
(1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and can be explained by the importance
of individual di®erences in school ability.
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7.3 How do people react to changes in risk
Our °exible speci¯cation of the log wage and the log employment regression
functions allow us to investigate how individuals react to changes in risk. In
particular, the heteroskedastic function for the variances allow us to evaluate the
e®ects of an overall change in earnings dispersion. Log normality implies that
E(Z) = exp(¹+ 0:5 ¢ ¾2) and V ar(Z) = exp(2¹+ ¾2) ¢ (exp(¾2)¡ 1): In order to
do so, we must change the variance of the log earnings regression (¾1) and adjust
the mean of the log earnings (¹) so that only earnings dispersion is changed.
The elasticity with respect to a change in risk is found to be small and positive
(0.07). The positive sign can be explained as follows. An increase in earnings risk
makes parental transfers relatively more appealing for risk averse individuals. As
a consequence, young individuals respond by staying in school longer. However,
given the very low level of risk aversion, the e®ect is small.
Table 5
Various Elasticities of Expected Schooling Attainments
Parameters elasticities
Wage Return
all levels 0.35
grade 16 0.11
School Subsidies
all levels 1.01
post high school 0.46
Wage subsidies -0.70
Risk
Earnings (¾2) 0.0700
19
8 Conclusion
We have estimated a dynamic programming model of schooling decisions in which
risk averse individuals make optimal sequential schooling decisions based on the
fact that schooling a®ects both the mean and the variance of lifetime wages and
employment rates. Our model ¯ts the data quite well and the results indicate
that individuals have a very low degree of risk (relative) aversion. The parame-
ter estimate of the degree of risk aversion, 0.9282, is just somewhat below the
degree of risk aversion implied by logarithmic preferences. At the same time,
our estimates of log wage and log employment rate regression functions indicate
that, after conditioning on individual speci¯c unobserved ability, wage dispersion
and employment rate dispersion are highly heteroskedastic. More precisely, both
wage and employment rate dispersions decrease with schooling. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that risk sharing agreements are more common among highly
educated (high wage) workers. Not surprisingly, mean schooling attainments are
found to be increasing in risk aversion; that is a counterfactual increase in the
degree of risk aversion will increase schooling attainments.
Finally, we have used our model to simulate the e®ects of a change in the
returns to education, a change in school (and wage) subsidies and a change in
risk on expected schooling attainments. The results indicate that schooling at-
tainments are relatively more elastic with respect to school subsidies than to the
return to schooling. Consistent with the low degree of risk aversion disclosed in
the data, an increase in earnings dispersion (an increase in the overall variance
of wages and employment rates) will raise schooling by a relatively small number
and the elasticity is quite small (around 0.07).
These ¯ndings suggest avenues for future research. As education can play
the role of self-insurance, it would be interesting to analyze the optimality of
social insurance in a context where human capital (schooling) is a substitute for
social insurance. Finally, it would be interesting to analyze optimal schooling
decisions in a context where workers can explicitly enter contractual agreements
with potential employers. We leave these potential extensions for future research.
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Table A1- Descriptive Statistics.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. # Individuals
prop. raised in urban areas 0.70 - 1019
father's educ (years) 11.27 3.43 1019
mother's educ (years) 11.34 2.54 1019
family income in 1978 37,685 27,224 1019
number of siblings 3.25 2.15 1019
prop. growing up in nuclear family 0.79 - 1019
prop. raised in southern states 0.28 - 1019
AFQT score 42.43 28.02 1019
education completed (as of May 1990) 12.25 2.45 1019
prop. students (in 1990) 0.01 - 1019
wage 1979 (per hour) 6.61 2.09 86
wage 1980(per hour) 6.55 2.41 224
wage 1981 (per hour) 6.74 2.64 342
wage 1982 (per hour) 6.93 2.92 496
wage 1983 (per hour) 6.74 2.79 593
wage 1984 (per hour) 7.09 3.23 683
wage 1985 (per hour) 7.65 3.25 719
wage 1986 (per hour) 8.30 3.57 732
wage 1987 (per hour) 9.08 4.16 775
wage 1988 (per hour) 9.79 4.60 830
wage 1989 (per hour) 9.93 4.72 826
wage 1990 (per hour) 10.45 4.86 823
Notes:
Family income and hourly wages are reported in 1990 dollars. Family income is
measured as of May 1979 (for 1978). The increasing number of wage observations
(until 1988) is explained by the increase in participation rates (schooling completion).
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Table A2
Structural Parameter Estimates
Parameter Std error
Utility in School
Father's Educ 0.0158 0.0010
Mother's Educ 0.0115 0.0011
Family Income/1000 0.0009 0.0002
Nuclear Family 0.0382 0.0050
Siblings -0.0108 0.0010
Rural -0.0071 0.0091
South -0.0209 0.0099
Risk Aversion 0.9282 0.0390
Discount Rate 0.0891 0.0031
Employment
Schooling 0.0116 0.0010
Exper. 0.0027 0.0005
Exper2. -0.0001 0.0000
¾e0 (intercept) -0.4084 0.0372
¾e1 (schooling) -0.1030 0.0120
¾e2 (schooling2) -0.0051 0.0009
Wages
spline 7-10 0.0070 0.0045
spline 11 0.0030 0.0004
spline 12 0.0407 0.0048
spline 13 -0.0820 0.0040
spline 14 0.0680 0.0046
spline 15 -0.0305 0.0053
spline 16 0.0489 0.0067
spline 17-more -0.0325 0.0038
Exper 0.1034 0.0044
Exper2 -0.0044 0.0004
¾w0 (intercept) -1.3739 0.0302
¾w1 (schooling) 0.0214 0.0102
¾w2 (schooling2) -0.0032 0.0010
Measurement error
¾2m 0.1444 0.0016
interruption prob
³7 0.0124 0.0103
³8 0.0621 0.0234
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Table A2- Continued
Structural Parameter Estimates
Parameter St Error
³9 0.0937 0.0248
³10 0.0270 0.0249
³11 0.1167 0.0072
³12 0.3420 0.0190
³13 0.1004 0.0476
³14 0.1217 0.0216
³15¡more 0.1220 0.0119
Unobs. Hetero.
Type 1
School ab. (À»1) -1.2147 0.0473
Wage (Àw1 ) 1.3463 0.0094
Employment À·1 -3.3629 0.0301
Type Prob. (q01) 1.6875 0.0419
Type 2
School ab. (À»2) -0.8354 0.0481
Wage ab. (Àw1 ) 1.6785 0.0192
Employment À·1 -0.1615 0.0113
Type Prob (q02) 1.0255 0.0378
Type 3
School ab. (À»3) -1.4983 0.0453
Wage (Àw1 ) 1.0529 0.0121
Employment (À·1 ) -0.1560 0.0241
Type Prob (q03) 1.5402 0.0098
Type 4
School ab. (À»4) -1.8252 0.0532
Wage (Àw4 ) 1.1546 0.0112
Employment (À·1 ) -0.5491 0.0204
Type Prob (q04) 0.1578 0.1396
Type 5
School ab. (À»5) -2.3599 0.0538
Wage (Àw1 ) 1.2591 0.0121
Employment (À·1 ) -1.0950 0.0269
Type Prob (q05) -1.1992 0.1913
Type 6
School ab. (À»6) -1.8127 0.0456
Wage (Àw1 ) 0.7072 0.0106
Employment (À·1 ) -0.2005 0.0141
Type Prob (q06) 0.0 (normalized)
mean Log Likelihood -8.02289
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